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Abstract 
Wearable devices have proliferated in usage and human experience, and they provide convenience for personal 
information requirements. These devices are both sensory and immersive for the diverse global network that is 
generally termed the Internet of things (IoT). The immediacy of the two-way communication created in the IoT has 
made vulnerable human behaviour and raised debate around information ownership and privacy expectations. The 
legitimacy of ownership of information and its reuse are prevalent problems. In this research, we tested four 
wearable devices that share 44% of the current market, for security vulnerabilities. We found serious weaknesses 
that could result in the unplanned disclosure of information and recommend further research into users 
expectations for safety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Wearable devices have been around for decades in the form of small electronic devices that compensate for human 
failure in for example, sight and hearing. Wearable hearing aids have been available in different forms for an 
extended period; however, the technology today is very different in flexibility and functionality from what was 
available 15 or 20 years ago. Today wearable devices are integrated into a body area network (BAN) for two-way 
communication and placed into a context that is generally termed the “Internet of Things” (IoT) (PwC, 2016). The 
purpose of these devices is not only to compensate for human physical and psychological failure, but more 
commonly to extend the reach of the human through interconnectivity with information sources (NIST, 2010). 
Consequently, today a human using a wireless Bluetooth earpiece may not be compensating for physical 
challenges but rather extending their sensory capability by connecting with personal or remote information 
sources. Developments that are more recent have included devices that monitor personal biological data, 
geolocation, and emotions. Some of these are used for health purposes, information exchange, and others for 
navigating around unfamiliar environments. The value of this technological opportunity is a global human 
experience of interconnectivity that has collapsed the barriers between internal and external environments and 
provided full personal immersion. In this fashion, a human may experience a fully augmented reality for the 
betterment of themselves and the systems in which they participate. The simplest functional architecture provides 
a connection between a wearable broadcast mechanism and a receiving station (Zhou, et al., 2014). Because most 
people have a smart phone on them most of the time, then the smart phone has become the receiving station for a 
multiplicity of different devices that the human may carry within their BAN. There are many examples of 
connectivity that both transmits information and receives information in the two-way relationship between the 
base station and the broadcast mechanism or sensors. The eyeglass that streams information to the user and directly 
to the eye has significant publicity. In addition, wearable watches and biometric monitoring equipment such as the 
Fitbit, provide personal information for decision-making (Burlacu, 2016; Stack, 2015). 
The personal nature of the information managed by the BAN has raised the issue of information ownership 
(Schelleus, et al., 2014). Personal expectations to control the information from a wearable device, such as a Fitbit, 
may be a foregone conclusion of the user, and yet the patient owners of the device, the owners of the software, 
and the owners of the cloud services, and others involved in the brokerage and intermediation of services may all 
assert ownership of the data. The borderless interconnectivity of human and networks also presents inter-
jurisdictional challenges regarding ownership of informational properties, and identification of who has the rights 
of disclosure and transaction. The fundamental principles of security design require the confidentiality, integrity, 
and accessibility to information. In situations where the user of a wearable device expects the exclusive ownership 
of the information that they produce using the device (Zhou, et al., 2014), then the confidentiality and the integrity 
of the information has to be preserved. Our research is concerned the vulnerability of wearable devices to attacks 
that can disclose the information the device produces. This research is an attempt to satisfy customer expectations 
for the confidentiality of their information, and the management of unwarranted disclosures. We tested four 
wearable devices that had 44% of the market share at the end of 2016 (IDC, 2016), for the presence of security 
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mechanisms that would preserve the confidentiality of information the device produced from the user actions. 
Each of these devices was presented on a watch strap to be attached to the wrist of the human. Each device had 
sensors that trapped a range of biometric data from the end user and also had interconnectivity to broadcast that 
information for processing, archiving, and providing feedback to the user. The majority of the information 
processing was done by cloud services in the form of historical logs that tracked and kept account of the user 
biometric data. All of the devices relied upon Bluetooth low energy as the wireless communication protocol for 
synchronisation back to the user smart phone (Great Scott, 2015). If the user did not wish to use their smart phone 
in for example, a gymnasium or a motor vehicle, then they could tether the device to the exercise machine, the 
motor vehicle network, or to any other local wireless network via the Bluetooth low energy connection for the 
same effect. The Bluetooth wireless and the tethering protocol is vulnerable to attacks that could violate the 
confidentiality of information, the integrity of information, and the accessibility to information when hijacked and 
subjected to service disruption (Cyr, et al., 2014). 
BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND METHOD 
A consistent theme in literature is the security vulnerability during the pairing of the wearable device with the base 
station. At the point of pairing the exchange of information is vulnerable. When pairing for the very first time 
Bluetooth employs one of three Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) strategies:   
 Just works – pairs automatically as it requires with no user interaction. Convenient for IoT accessibility 
but the least secure.  
 Numeric comparison - When pairing for the first time both the wearable and smartphone display an 
identical four to six-digit numerical key. If they match, the smartphone prompts the user to accept the 
connection. 
 Passkey entry - both devices have a user interface for entering a four to six-digit code. One, or both 
devices must enter a passkey to successfully pair. The authors credit this approach as being the most 
secure (Lotfy & Hale, 2016; Pieterse & Olivier, 2014) 
A review of three wearables by Lotfy and Hale (2016) found that the security of pairing strategies had significant 
gaps and potential vulnerabilities including:  
 Man-in-the-middle attacks, eavesdropping, and packet injection. These kinds of attacks allow attackers 
to actively spy on wearable devices (user-correlation) and misuse the data. 
The Pairing processes are defined as: 
o Generic Access Profile (GAP) – the wearable defines a specific advertising protocol. This is 
important in our research design as this happens subsequent to initial pairing during recurring 
connection instances.  
o Generic Attribute Profile (GATT) – service framework on top of the underlying transport 
protocol, called ATT (Attribute Protocol), which sets the mutually agreed data transfer standard. 
o Both GAP and GATT operate in the 2.4 GHz bandwidth, transmitting at a speed of 1Mbit/sec. 
While Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) operates on the same frequencies as other Bluetooth technologies, it operates 
differently on the link and physical layer. BLE uses 40 total channels; three are used for advertising by unconnected 
wearables. The remaining 37 channels are used during GATT for data transmission after pairing. The sequential 
pairing process is shown in Figure 1 (Lotfy and Hale, 2016, p.3).  
 
Figure1: GAP BluetoothLE advertising process showing advertising data, scan request, scan response and gap 
initiation packets 
Personally identifiable information (PII) is information that is assignable to a particular human system factor and 
in some jurisdictions has legal protection (Boyle & Panko, 2014). Broadcasting a fixed MAC address, tied to an 
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individual’s identity would fail the PII test by creating a unique user signature. When wearables create such a risk 
without user notification, then breaches the privacy has to be considered jurisdiction by jurisdiction. For example, 
the European Parliament’s, Protection of Personal Data Directive, enacted on 5 May 2016 and requiring member 
states to have introduced into their national law by 6 May 2018, extends the definition of personal data to include 
that which can “be identified, directly or indirectly” (European Parliament, 2016, p. 3). A fixed MAC address, 
which risks unseen surveillance, breaches this requirement. The literature analysis identified that there are many 
attack classes (see Figure 2) in and around the use of Bluetooth connectivity. To focus our research and to make 
it feasible in the laboratory we selected the two attack classes and the five specific attacks highlighted in blue 
(Hassen, et al., 2017). In respect to Surveillance class, the risk created by a digital signature can be sub-categorised 
as:   
i. Blue-Printing – MAC address spoofing for a man-in-the middle attack. 
ii. Blue-Stumbling - Forced re-pairing attack. 
iii. Blue-Tracking – a brute force attack designed to determine the data encryption key if one is used.  
 
Figure 2 – Classification of Bluetooth Attacks (Hassan et al., 2017, p. 5) 
In this research we tested four wearable devices that were selected from the top sales performers in the market and 
together they held a 44% share of the market at the end of 2016 (Cry, et al., 2014; Guo, 2015). The analysis was 
conducted in the research laboratory during the first two months of 2017. Figure 3 shows the release dates and 
devices selected (software versions were those at the time and do not account for any more recent updates). 
 
 
Figure 3. The wearable devices tested 
The research was structured to address concerns around device information visibility, pairing visibility, 
surveillance potential, and information disclosure. The major focus was on potential eavesdropping and 
surveillance attacks. All of the wearable devices relied upon Bluetooth low energy (BLE) as the wireless 
communication protocol for data synchronisation between the device and the user smart phone (or other paired 
network) (Grassi, 2014). The only variation was the Samsung Gear3 that was using version BLE 4.2 rather than 
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BLE 4.0. The testing with different smart phones was to confirm the consistence of the protocol on different 
devices. BLE is feasible for use across the Apple iOS, Android, Apple Mac OS, Linux and Microsoft Windows 
operating systems. In the testing we used a Samsung S6 edge, HTC 1M7, and an Apple iPhone 5S, but did not 
detect any variations in the BLE protocol execution that related to research concerns. For sniffing tools we selected 
Ubertooth, the HCI snoop log and the Adafruit sniffer (Lofty, et al., 2016). 
The method used two Android phones, and the Adafruit for capture of the BLE packets, and TCP dump in to 
pcapng and pcap files respectively. The files acquired were then uploaded into Wireshark, an open source packet 
analyser with a graphical user interface and filtering capability. Using Wireshark the data was examined to 
determine whether it was transmitted in plain text, or in an encrypted format. Other analysis proceeded to locate 
any digital signatures, device identification, mappings for the wearer's movements and habits, internet access to 
device logs and databases, and geolocation correlation data. All the wearables include a back-end cloud service in 
which an individual’s data is stored to ensure portability across devices, and we looked for any credentials 
providing access rights. The research design is shown in Figure 4, and the blue box indicates the target zone for 
the sniffing of pairing activity. 
 
Figure 4. Research Design 
FINDINGS 
The HCI snoop log is an application that sits on smart phones. It was used in each instance to successfully capture 
the BLE log file which was then uploaded to Wireshark for analysis. Both encrypted and unencrypted information 
was found. The unencrypted packets were advertising packets that included the connection request and response. 
The remainder of the packets were encrypted suggesting that once the exchange protocols and keys have been 
agreed, all messages were encrypted. We found that the majority of the wearable devices packets were encrypted 
and the extent of the security mechanisms varied on a device-by-device basis, despite all of them relying upon the 
BLE protocol. The Adafruit sniffer could successfully follow a device once the connection had been established. 
The Ubertooth had a similar performance. Using the Adafruit for interception we found that when the wearable 
device and the base station paired the identity was disclosed in plain text. It may be good for efficiency purposes 
to have the brand and the watch identity publicly displayed in the wireless network, but for an attacker this is a 
bonus and makes an easy target. Each wearable device had a different performance and a different susceptibility 
to attack. Surprisingly the Amazon fit broadcasted the long-term encryption key in plain text during the initial 
setup as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. A Plain Text Encryption Key captured 
Notably the other wearable devices had encrypted this information. However, the MAC address of the Charge and 
Surge did not change once connected, an identical result to the Amazon fit. The literature we had read stated that 
Fitbit had addressed the MAC vulnerability, but our findings suggested otherwise. A fixed MAC address for a 
session creates the risk of an attack vector based on user correlation or blue tracking. However, the research did 
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show that some of the previously reported vulnerabilities had been addressed by the end of 2016. For example, the 
Gear S3 was found to have advanced security mechanisms that were in keeping with the newer BLE version 4.2, 
and was the most secure. However, our research showed that the HCI snoop log functionality found in most 
smartphones captured the identity of the message senders, as well as the message in plain text. With this function 
enabled the smart phones owner’s conversations using email, SMS and messaging applications such as Facebook 
are preserved until a log is deleted. In Figure 6 this vulnerability is illustrated from our experiments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Snoop log plaintext disclosures 
Overall, the lab testing of these devices shows that manufacturers have made big steps to improve the security 
around wearable devices. The security improvements in BLE version 4.2 have shut down some of the previous 
attack vectors and undoubtedly, further improvements are evolving during 2017. In the wearable devices tested, 
the security vulnerabilities detected indicate the threat classes potentially faced by a user. It is also notable that the 
different wearable devices have different vulnerabilities but the most predominant issue to date is the disclosure 
of the MAC, which allows for user correlation and blue printing attacks. The Amazfit performed the poorest out 
of the four tested. It failed in each of the four threat classes, whereas the Gear S3 with the updated BLE version 
performed the best in our tests. The implication of these findings is for corporates, such as health insurers, who 
provide benefits to the customer when they are using wearable devices that have health control feedback loops 
(MLC, 2017). In the case of a wearable device that is vulnerable to manipulation, the sponsoring corporate may 
not have confidence that the information they are receiving, and the information on which they will make decisions 
regarding providing benefits to their customer, can be trusted. In the bigger picture, wearable devices may fail 
compliance criteria such as the requirements of the European Personal Data Directive. In these situations, the 
purchaser requires notification in the specifications of the device regarding the security precautions for information 
protection. There also needs to be independent testing so that the shrink-wrap claims may have some external 
validation. Figure 7. shows the results from the laboratory testing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Summary of Vulnerability 
CONCLUSION 
Wearable devices are convenient technologies that extend human natural senses and capabilities. Our research 
shows that further consideration of information protection is required to avoid disclosure failures. The 
improvement of information security by adopting countermeasures for pairing vulnerabilities will allow the 
producer of the information choices regarding the control of its ownership.   Further research topics arising from 
this research for future projects are: 
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The HCI Snoop log paired with the base station – Is the number of log files, and degree of information captured 
controlled by the base station, the device, or both?  
The Decrypt packets of the Amazfit – Future research should confirm that having the long term key is sufficient 
to decrypt the information exchanged with the smartphone. Also, consumer testing should be broadened to include 
data synchronisation from the smartphone to the web application.  
PII failings – Determine whether the security vulnerabilities breach consumer privacy laws in key markets.  
A broader range of attacks – Extend the man-in-middle attacks to intercept and manipulate communications. This 
has far-reaching implications, not just limited to wearables but also to other IoT setups.  
Framework – A compliance framework which brings visibility to data protections in wearables, addresses 
standards, and reduces industry wide variations. 
Further research is required to establish baselines for wearable device user expectations. At present the technology 
is made functional and accessible to users but we argue that development is required to meet the full scope of 
socio-technical expectations. Current users want the advantages of the technology, they are using it in increasing 
numbers, but they also want assurances unwanted surprises of a personal nature will not be forthcoming. Such 
unwanted attention is unsolicited advertising, personal profiling, geolocation matching, and so on. Our research 
shows that the confidentiality and potential integrity of data produced by wearable devices tested were easily 
compromised. More than a regular patch-by-patch updating of software is required to assure users their 
information safety has been adequately addressed. 
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